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and experimental evidence
Abstract
This paper presents models for search behavior and provides experimental evidence that behavioral
heterogeneity in search is linked to heterogeneity in individual preferences. Observed search behavior is
more consistent with a new model that assumes dynamic updating of utility reference points than with
models that are based on expected-utility maximization. Specifically, reference point updating and loss
aversion play a role for more than a third of the population. The findings are of practical relevance as
well as of interest for researchers who incorporate behavioral heterogeneity into models of dynamic
choice behavior in, for example, consumer economics, labor economics, finance, and decision theory.
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1 Introduction
Dynamic choice situations are prevalent in our everyday lives, for example when we go
shopping, search for a new job, or trade on the stock market. Existing research finds
that people are very heterogeneous with respect to their behavior in dynamic choice
situations (see, e.g., Boswijk et al., 2007; Hommes et al., 2005a; Sonnemans, 1998, 2000),
and economic theory suggests that this heterogeneity in dynamic choice situations is
reflected in preference heterogeneity. For example, we would expect systematic differences
in dynamic choice behavior between very risk averse and very risk seeking types of people.
This raises the following questions: Does information on individual preferences help us
predict how people behave in dynamic choice situations? Is there further heterogeneity
in dynamic choice behavior that differences in individual preferences cannot explain, for
example because behavior is not consistent with the predictions of standard preference-
based economic models? The answers to these questions concern the foundations of
dynamic choice behavior. However, while there is an enormous experimental literature
on the foundations of decision behavior in static decision situations, the foundations of
behavior in dynamic decision situations, despite being equally important, remain largely
unexplored.
This paper explores the foundations of dynamic choice behavior by answering the ques-
tions above. I do so by using laboratory experiments that test various models of dynamic
choice behavior, providing evidence on the link between preferences and real observed
dynamic choice behavior. The specific contributions of this paper are as follows: First, I
develop a new dynamic choice model that involves sequential updating of utility reference
points. Second, I provide evidence from two experiments that this reference point model
explains heterogeneity in individual search behavior better than search models based on
expected utility theory. And third, I show that while heterogeneity in search behavior
can be systematically linked to heterogeneity in individual preferences for many subjects,
there is also a considerable fraction of subjects, whose search behavior is inconsistent with
the predictions of utility-based economic models. In other words: preference heterogeneity
alone cannot explain all heterogeneity in search behavior.
Economic science assumes that preferences are the key determinants of behavior. There-
fore, knowing which preferences are related to real observed behavior is of inherent interest
for the field. In fact, structural knowledge about the link between preferences and behavior
is an important requirement for normative as well as for positive economics. More specif-
ically, the findings of this paper are of interest for researchers who are building models
of behavior in dynamic choice situations, and they are relevant for decision theory, since
they help to understand the determinants and properties of individual search behavior in
markets (e.g., Zwick et al., 2003). The findings also serve as a guide to theoretical and
structural econometric specifications that explicitly allow for individual heterogeneity in
applied search theory; these specifications are being developed in many fields, including
research on consumer search and job search (Eckstein and van den Berg, 2007). Finally,
since little is known about reference point formation over time in dynamically risky de-
cision situations, my findings are relevant for numerous theoretical and applied issues in
finance, e.g. when it comes to stock selling decisions (Baucells et al., 2007; Gneezy, 2005;
Grinblatt and Han, 2005), as well as for life-cycle savings decisions (Bowman et al., 1999).
The experimental and theoretical investigation of dynamic choice behavior requires a
decision task that is representative of dynamic choice situations in our real life as well
as implementable in the laboratory without loss of control. Such a task is a search task.
First, the simple decision structure of search tasks masks a complicated optimization
problem that – comparable to dynamic choice situations in our everyday lives – cannot be
solved without a computer; at the same time, these tasks occur often in our everyday life,
e.g. when we look for the best price for a certain product or when we search for a new job.
Second, search tasks are attractive for laboratory investigations, because participants in a
laboratory experiment understand immediately their simple sequential decision structure.
It is thus no surprise that decision behavior in search situations has been intensively
investigated both theoretically and experimentally in the fields of economics, mathematics,
and psychology since the 1950’s. Simon (1955) and Stigler (1961) completed seminal
theoretical work in the economic strand of this literature. Since then, numerous authors
(e.g., Cox and Oaxaca, 1989; Harrison and Morgan, 1990; Hey, 1981; 1982; 1987; Houser
and Winter, 2004; Kogut, 1990; Schunk and Winter, 2009; Sonnemans, 1998; 2000) have
investigated variations of search problems, and they have focused on examining which
search strategies exist. However, the central question addressed by this paper, the extent
to which theoretical models explain the link between individual heterogeneity in search
strategies and heterogeneity in preferences, remains unexplored. Finally, it is also worth
mentioning that there is a growing literature on dynamic models with heterogeneous
expectations (see, e.g., the survey by Hommes, 2006); the behavioral foundations of this
literature are also investigated experimentally (Heemeijer et al., 2009; Hommes et al.,
2005b). While the price process is endogenous in this literature, the price distribution is
exogenous in my experimental setup, i.e. it is neither affected by individual expectations
nor by individual decisions. This allows me to focus only on the question how preference
heterogeneity and dynamic choice strategies are linked.
This paper proceeds as follows. First, I develop various search models, in particular
the reference point model, in order to discuss the links between individual preferences
and search behavior (section 2). Then, the experimental designs (section 3) and the
methodology for drawing inference about search behavior and preferences based on data
from two experiments are described (section 4). Next, the link between elicited preferences
and observed search behavior is investigated (section 5): I present descriptive information,
a correlation analysis, and a structural econometric analysis that exploits the discrete
time-to-event panel nature of the data. The methodology and possible explanations for
the findings are discussed in section 6; section 7 concludes.
2 Models of Search Behavior
In this section I first derive the optimal search behavior of an expected utility maximizer
(section 2.1). For the derivation of the decision rules, two cases are considered: In the first
case, the cost of each completed search step is treated as sunk costs; in the second case,
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I derive the finite horizon optimal stopping rule assuming that subjects do not treat past
search costs as sunk costs. Finally, in section 2.2, I develop the reference point model.
2.1 Optimal Stopping Behavior in Search Tasks
Assume that a searcher’s goal is to purchase a certain good that she values at e100. The
searcher sequentially observes any number of realizations of a random variable X, which
has the distribution function F (·). In the current experiment, F (·) is a discrete uniform
distribution with lower bound e75 and upper bound e150. Let the cost of searching
a new location be e c. Assume that at some stage in the search process, the minimal
price that the searcher has observed so far is e m.1 Basic search theory assumes that
individuals treat the cost of each search step, once completed, as sunk costs (Kogut, 1990;
Lippman and McCall, 1976) and that they compare the payoff of one additional search
step with the payoff from stopping.2
Then, subjects solve the problem based on a one-step forward-induction strategy and the
expected gain from searching once more before stopping, G(m), is generally given by:
G(m) = − [1− F (m)]m︸ ︷︷ ︸⊗ −
∫ m
75
xdF (x)︸ ︷︷ ︸⊕ −c+m. (1)
The term
⊗
accounts for the case in which a price larger than m is found with probability
(1−F (m)). In this case, m remains the minimum price. The term⊕ stands for the case
in which a lower price than m is found and computes the expected value in this case.
There exists a unique price m∗ with G(m∗) = 0, if G(·) is continuous and monotonic.
Straightforward manipulation shows that the solution to this problem is identical to solv-
ing the following problem for m:
pi(100−m) = (1− F (m))pi(100−m− c) +
∫ m
75
pi(100− x− c)dF (x) (2)
Here, pi(·) is the payoff-function from the search game. The payoff is truncated at 0 in
the experiment:
pi(x) = max{0, x} (3)
The left-hand side of equation (2) is the payoff from stopping, and the right-hand side
denotes the payoff from continuing the search. It is found that the optimal strategy is
to keep searching until a price of X less than, or equal to, the optimal price m∗ has
been observed. For the search task considered in this paper, I find m∗ = 86. That is, a
risk-neutral searcher has the following decision rule: Stop searching as soon as a price less
than or equal to 86 is found.
1 For the remainder of the paper, the currency units are skipped whenever possible. All monetary values
are in euros.
2 Kogut’s (1990) findings show that a certain proportion of subjects does not treat search cost as sunk.
A model in which search cost are not treated as sunk cost is presented later in this section.
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Now assume a searcher with an arbitrary, monotone utility function u(·). The equation
that determines her reservation price m∗ then has the following form that follows from
(2):3
u(100−m) = (1− F (m))u(100−m− c) +
∫ m
75
u(100− x− c)dF (x) (4)
Equation (4) is solved numerically for the reservation price m∗(η), given the search en-
vironment and a utility function on gains that is parameterized entirely by a parameter
(vector) η. The solution has the constant reservation price property, independent of the
functional form of u(·). Figure 1 shows the constant reservation price decision rule for
different risk attitude parameters of, e.g., a CRRA or a CARA utility function. The more
risk averse the searcher is, the higher is her constant reservation price. Henceforth, I
refer to rules of this type as forward optimal rules, keeping in mind that this rule is only
optimal conditional on the individual utility function and on the assumption of a one-step
forward strategy that ignores sunk costs.
** Include figure 1 about here **
Now, consider that subjects do not treat search costs as sunk costs. That is, for their
decision whether to stop or to continue the search, they consider the total benefits and
costs of the search; the agent stops searching only if the stopping value is higher than the
continuation value. It follows that the problem is treated as a finite horizon problem that
is solved backwards. Define St = {t,m} as the agents’ state vector after t search steps.
After the agent has stopped searching, she will buy the item and she receives a total
payoff:
Π(St) = max{0, 100−m− t · c}. (5)
The agent stops searching only if the continuation value of the search is lower than the
stopping value. The recursive formulation of the decision problem is therefore:
Jt(St) = max{Π(St), E[Jt+1(St+1)|St]}. (6)
E(·) represents the mathematical expectations operator, and the expectation is taken
with respect to the distribution of St+1|St. Again, this problem has the reservation price
property at every t. The reservation price begins at 86, first stays constant, then starts
decaying slowly, reaches 80 in the 19th round, and then decays at a rate of about one per
round from that point forward.
For a searcher with an arbitrary, monotone utility function u(·), the payoff function is
then:
Πu(St) = max{0, u(100−m− t · c)}. (7)
The corresponding recursive formulation of the dynamic discrete choice problem is:
Jut = max{Πu(St), E[Jut+1(St+1)|St]}. (8)
3 This equation does not characterize the optimal solution to the search problem. It gives the optimal
strategy for a searcher with arbitrary risk attitude, captured by u(x), who ignores sunk costs, and who
uses a one-step forward induction strategy.
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This problem has, at every t, the reservation price property. The monotonically falling
reservation price implies that the agent should not exercise recall, i.e. she should not recall
previously rejected prices. Figure 2 plots the reservation price paths for a CRRA-utility
function specification; figure 3 assumes a CARA-specification. Henceforth, I refer to rules
of this type as backward optimal rules. These rules are optimal search rules conditional
on the individual utility function.
** Include figure 2 about here **
** Include figure 3 about here **
From the theoretical deliberations so far it can be inferred that – regardless of what type
of rule subjects use, forward or backward optimal rules – the more risk averse a person
is, the earlier she should stop search, i.e. the higher is the reservation price that she uses.
2.2 The Reference Point Model
When talking to people that are actually facing a search situation, for example graduate
students on the job market, many people talk about their decision situation as if they
were comparing their possible future offers from continuing the search with the current
best alternative that they have already been offered. They consider everything that is
worse than the current best payoff that they have for sure as a loss relative to that sure
payoff, and everything that is better is considered as a gain relative to the sure payoff. The
model that I develop in this section, the reference point model (henceforth: rp-model),
captures this idea that future possible payoffs are compared to a reference point. The
model is based on a concept from the psychology of decision-making, the concept of loss
aversion, which plays a central role in Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) descriptive theory
of decision-making under risk. Loss aversion refers to the tendency of people to be more
sensitive to reductions in their current level of well-being than to increases. The rp-model
claims that during the search task, subjects set reference points relative to which the de-
cision whether to stop or to continue the search is evaluated in terms of gains and losses.
While the models based on EU-maximization (see previous subsection) implicitly assume
that the reference point is always at zero payoff, the rp-model assumes a reference point
which is always at the current best payoff.
To formalize these ideas, let u(·) be the individual utility function. Following Kahneman
and Tversky (1979), I decompose the function into the utility function on gains, u+(·),
and the utility function on losses, u−(·):
u(x) =
{
u+(x) x ≥ 0
u−(x) x < 0.
(9)
Subjects have to decide whether to stop or to continue the search at every search step t.
The reference point at time t is the payoff that they get from stopping when they realize
the best price draw, mt, that they have in hand at time t. The utility from continuing
the search is evaluated relative to this reference point:
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If subjects find a price lower [higher] than mt− c in the next round t+1, they make a net
gain [loss] relative to their current situation where they have mt in hand – see the term⊗
[
⊕
] in (10).
The model implicitly assumes that subjects solve the problem based on one-step forward-
induction. In the rp-model the expected gain at time t from searching once more before
stopping, G(mt), is given by
G(mt) =
∫ mt−c
−∞
u+(mt − x− c)dF (x)︸ ︷︷ ︸⊗
+
∫ mt
mt−c
u−(mt − x− c)dF (x) + (1− F (mt)) · u−(−c)︸ ︷︷ ︸⊕ . (10)
That is, the model assumes that people sequentially update their reference point in every
time step. Model (10) is stationary in the same sense as the forward optimal model (4):
The search behavior is independent of time t since subjects focus on the marginal gain
or loss from the next step but not on the total payoff from the search. Identical with
the prediction of the forward optimal search model (4), this model results in a constant
reservation price over time. As in the forward optimal search model, the negligence of
the sunk costs incurred during the search process is here responsible for the stationarity
of the model.
I rewrite equation (10) for simplicity. For this purpose, define p(x,mt) as the rp-payoff-
function, i.e. the function that determines individual payoff (relative to the reference
point) in the framework of the rp-model (10), conditional on having the best offer mt in
hand at time t:
p(x,mt) =
{
mt − x− c x ≤ mt
−c x > mt
(11)
With the help of (11), the rp-model (10) is equivalently written as:
G(mt) =
∫ mt−c
−∞
u+(p(x,mt))dF (x) +
∫ ∞
mt−c
u−(p(x,mt))dF (x)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
u(p(x,mt))dF (x). (12)
Several studies (e.g., Kogut, 1990; Sonnemans, 1998) find that many subjects also focus
(to some extent) on total earnings from the search game, instead of only focusing on the
marginal return of another draw. This translates into a reservation price that does not
remain constant, but is falling when t increases, similar to the prediction of the backward
optimal model (8).
In the framework of the rp-model, this means that subjects take into account that total
payoff is left-truncated at 0. In other words, if subjects focus on total earnings, they take
into account that when continuing the search, they do not risk losing money if their payoff
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at the current reference point is already 0. That is, the maximal loss that they can incur
is the search cost (if the payoff at the reference point is higher than the search cost), or
the payoff at the reference point (if the payoff at the reference point is less than the search
cost).
This idea, namely that subjects also focus on total earnings instead of only focusing on
the marginal return of another draw, is translated into the framework of the rp-model by
a modification of the rp-payoff-function.
For this purpose, I first define two functions q(·) and v(·):
q(y) =
{
q(y) = y y ≥ 0
0 y < 0
(13)
v(y) =
{
v(y) = y y ≥ −c
0 y < −c (14)
The modified rp-payoff-function p(x,mt, t) now has the following form.
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p(x,mt, t) =

q(100− c · t− x− c) mt ≥ 100− c · t
v(mt − x− c) mt < 100− c · t ∧ x ≤ mt
v(mt − (100− c · t)) mt < 100− c · t ∧ x > mt
(15)
With the modified version of the rp-payoff-function, the rp-model (12) is written as follows:
G(mt) =
∫ mt−c
−∞
u+(p(x,mt, t))dF (x) +
∫ ∞
mt−c
u−(p(x,mt, t))dF (x)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
u(p(x,mt, t))dF (x). (16)
I have now developed two search models, (16) and (10), that assume that subjects update
their reference points during the search process. The EU-based models presented in the
previous subsection are based on only one branch of the utility function, u+(·), that is, in
these models, behavior can essentially be captured by a one-parameter functional form.
However, both rp-models are based on two independent branches of the utility function,
u+(·) and u−(·). In line with existing empirical studies on loss aversion (e.g., Benartzi
and Thaler, 1995; Schmidt and Traub, 2002; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), I therefore
assume the following one-parameter form of the reference point utility function:
u(x) =
{
u+(x) = x x ≥ 0
u−(x) = λ · x x < 0 (17)
This functional form imposes that only the kink at the utility reference point plays a
role for observed search behavior. This assumption is introduced to reduce the reference
point model to only one preference parameter (as in the case of the EU-based models)
which can be identified with a standard experimental method, and I impose the same
assumption for the identification of loss aversion measures based on the experimental
data. The measurement of a parameter that characterizes loss aversion is, of course,
always connected to a functional form assumption and there is a discussion about the
definition and empirical measurement of an index for loss aversion (see Johnson et al.,
4 A detailed derivation of the function p(x,mt, t) is given in the appendix of the paper which is available
in the JEDC Supplement Archive.
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2006; Koebberling and Wakker, 2005).5 I will come back to this important issue later in
this paper and I will also argue that the main conclusions from this paper are robust to
this assumption. Based on utility specification (17), the crucial parameter that determines
individual search behavior is now the individual loss aversion parameter λ. The stationary
rp-model (10) implies a constant reservation price search rule; the level of the reservation
price path is a function of loss attitude λ.6
The non-stationary rp-model (16) implies, in line with the stationary rp-model (10),
a reservation price path that varies systematically with the loss aversion parameter λ:
the higher loss aversion, the higher the reservation price. However, in contrast to the
stationary rp-model, the reservation price starts falling after a certain number of time-
steps (see figure 4).
** Include figure 4 about here **
The stopping rules derived from the reference point models (10) and (16) are comparable
to two classical search models that are based on EU-maximization:
– The stationary rp-model (10) predicts the same search behavior as the EU-based forward
optimal search model (equation (4)), and both models assume that subjects ignore sunk
costs.
– Similar to the EU-based model (8), the non-stationary rp-model (16) predicts that the
reservation price is first constant and starts falling after a certain number of time steps.
In both models, subjects do not ignore sunk costs.
While EU-based models and the rp-model predict very similar search behavior, the expla-
nation for the search behavior is different: In the rp-model, loss aversion explains the level
of the reservation price path, whereas in the EU-models, risk aversion explains this level.
The rp-model is built on the idea that “loss aversion [...] provides a direct explanation for
modest-scale risk aversion” (Rabin, 2000, p. 1288). Due to the similar predictions of the
models, distinguishing between these preference-based explanations for search behavior
requires independent measures of individual preferences, which I elicit in the experiment
for each subject using standard lottery procedures.7 I come back to this point in section
5.2.
5 For example, equation (17) implies that λ is a global measure of loss aversion, but it is obvious that
under the assumption of more flexible functional forms for u+(·) and u−(·), loss aversion could also
be defined locally, i.e. as a function of x. As section 3 shows, I estimate six different measures of loss
aversion (based on six different x-values and one aggregate estimate for loss aversion) for each subject
and the results of this paper are investigated for all six measures. This serves as a robustness check,
because it underlines that the findings of this paper are independent of a specific local measure of loss
aversion.
6 Algebraic transformations show that under (17) the rp-model (10) is identical to the classical risk
neutral forward induction model (2) under the assumption that λ = 1.
7 It is tempting to find a parametrization of the decision environment (i.e., search cost c and price dis-
tribution F (·)), in which the (empirical) identification of the underlying preferences based on only the
observed search behavior (and without additional and independent preference information) would be
easier. This would require finding an environment, in which the models do not yield similar predictions
over observed ranges of the underlying preference parameters. Further theoretical deliberations as well
as simulation studies, obtainable from the author upon request, show that identification is not easier
in other environments. The key issue is that at the search step where the models yield different pre-
dictions, most subjects have already stopped searching. For example, consider a risk neutral searcher.
This person has a constant reservation price of 86 for 8 search steps (see figure 2 and figure 3), but if
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3 Experimental Design
Two experiments have been conducted. Both experiments combine a lottery-based pref-
erence elicitation mechanism with a price search task, in order to link information from
an independent measure of individual preferences with information on sequential decision
behavior. Both experiments differ mainly in the preference elicitation method. Therefore,
I describe the design of the first experiment (henceforth referred to as experiment I) in
detail and I outline the design of experiment II only at the end of this section.
3.1 Experiment I
Experiment I consisted of three parts (A, B, and C) that were presented to the subjects
in fixed alphabetical order. Parts A and C of the experiment served to elicit parameters
that characterize subjects’ preferences, and part B consisted of a series of repeated price
search tasks used to elicit subjects’ search behavior.
Note at this point that the decision in the price search task (part B), namely whether
to stop (s) or to continue (c) the search, corresponds conceptually to the choice between
a sure payoff (s) and a lottery (c) with several consequences. In order to create similar
decision situations in both, the search task (part B) and the preference elicitation parts
(part A and C), the certainty equivalent method (e.g., Wakker and Deneffe (1996) for
risk aversion, and Tversky and Kahneman (1992) for loss aversion) has been used for
preference elicitation. This way, subjects also deal with decision situations involving the
comparison between a sure payoff (s) and a lottery (c) in the preference elicitation part of
the experiment. The certainty equivalent method was used in this experiment since the
decision situation used in this method is most similar to the decision situation in search
tasks, as mentioned above.8 The method has been used with various starting parameters,
both for the case of loss and risk aversion, to get an estimate of the robustness of the
results.9
The description of the design begins with part C, continues with part A, and ends with
part B. This makes some details of the design clearer.
she were behaving according to the rp-model (see figure 4) she has a constant reservation price of 86 for
13 search steps. Now, the probability that I observe her searching for more than 8 steps (which would
allow for discrimination between the two models) is only (1 − ( 1276 ))8 ≈ 25%, and this percentage –
one possible measure for how clearly one can discriminate between EU-based models and the rp-model
based on observed search behavior alone – does not change much if the search environment is modified,
i.e. if I use different price distributions or search cost. I make a similar argument in the appendix
(available in the JEDC Supplement Archive), section 8.4, in the discussion about the assumptions that
underlie the empirical analysis of search behavior.
8 Wakker and Deneffe (1996) used - also at the University of Mannheim where the present experiment
takes place and at various other places - the same elicitation method with the same stimuli, identical
number of iterations, and identical probability parameters, but with different starting values. This
method has the advantage that subjects are exposed to only few lottery decisions and – specifically in
this study – that it involves comparisons between sure payoffs and lotteries.
9 To further motivate the usage of the certainty equivalent method, note that it avoids using probabilities
other than 50-50-probabilities. 50-50-probabilities have the advantage that they are well-known to most
decision-makers through events such as throwing coins.
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Part C: Risk Attitude
In part C, the certainty equivalent method (e.g., Wakker and Deneffe, 1996) is used to
elicit individual risk attitude. That is, subjects are presented with a two-outcome lottery
(c) and a sure payoff (s) and they are asked to enter one missing value such that they
are indifferent between the sure payoff and the participation in the lottery. In total, only
three lotteries are presented to the subjects.
Two values, xmin =e0 and xmax =e24, are defined. The subject is asked to enter a
sure payoff, the certainty equivalent s0.50, that is as attractive to her as the participation
in the lottery (xmin, 50%; xmax, 50%). In the second question, the subject is asked to
enter the sure payoff s0.25 that is as attractive to her as the lottery (xmin, 50%; s0.5, 50%).
Finally, in the last question, the subject is asked to reveal indifference between the lottery
(s0.5, 50%; xmax, 50%) and a sure payoff by stating the sure payoff s0.75.
The values 0, s0.25, s0.5, s0.75, and 24 are equally spaced in terms of their utility. This
allows for the estimation of the individual utility function, and I obtain a risk attitude
index for each subject in the domain between e0 and e24.10
Part A: Loss Attitude
Part A consists of two blocks, (A-1) and (A-2), that are presented in random order, such
that a direct order effect on the behavior in the search task can be excluded. In block
(A-1) I use a method by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). Subjects are again presented
with a 50-50-gamble (x, 50%; y, 50%) and a sure outcome (s). In all five presented lottery
tasks the sure consequence (s) has the value e0. One consequence of the two-outcome
lottery has a value of x ∈ {-1,-10,-25,-50,-100}. These values are presented in random
order. Subjects are asked to enter the monetary value y of the other outcome of this
50-50-lottery such that the lottery and the sure payoff of e0 are equally attractive to
them (i.e., they have to adjust a mixed prospect to acceptability).11
In block (A-2), subjects are presented with three pure certainty-equivalent lotteries of the
same type as in part C, but with xmin =e1 and xmax =e9.12
Part B: Search Behavior
In part B subjects perform a sequence of search tasks. Each subject’s goal is to purchase
a certain good that she values at e100. The good is sold at infinitely many locations13,
10 Note that the search task is designed such that subjects could also earn at least e0 and at most e24.
11 Please see the appendix, available in the JEDC Supplement Archive, figure 5, for the graphical pre-
sentation of the lotteries.
12 The lottery with xmax =e24 was intentionally not shown in part A (but only in part C) in order
to exclude an effect on the behavior in the search task in which the maximum possible gain is e24.
The main purpose of the lotteries in block (A-2) in the framework of this design, in which the order
of (A-1) and (A-2) was randomized, was to exclude systematic effects of (A-1) on the search task.
Note that the data from (A-2) can still be used to check the validity of the analyses presented in this
paper: I find that the conclusions of this paper are independent of which risk attitude parameters,
those stemming from part C or those stemming from part (A-2), are used in the analysis.
13 In other words, subjects are not prevented from searching as long as they want. It is not reasonable,
however, to search for more than 25 steps, because, given the payoff structure, every search task lasting
for more than 25 rounds ends with a zero payoff. No subject has searched for more than 25 steps.
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and visiting a new location costs e1. Subjects are informed that the integer price at each
location is drawn independently from a uniform price distribution with a lower bound of
e75 and an upper bound of e150. After each price draw, subjects can stop and choose
any price encountered so far, or they can continue their search at the incremental cost
of another euro. The outcome of each search task is calculated as the evaluation of the
object (100) minus the price at the chosen location minus the accumulated search cost.
To ensure that subjects are experienced with the task and to minimize the observation
of learning behavior, subjects are allowed to perform an unlimited number of practice
search tasks before performing a sequence of 15 tasks that determine their payoff for part
B of the experiment. Finally, after the experiment is completed, one of these 15 rounds
is selected randomly to determine the payoff.
The search-model question.
After the search task is finished, there is one additional lottery question (henceforth re-
ferred to as the search-model question), worded as follows:14
You have now dealt with lottery tasks and a price search task. Perhaps you have realized
that the decision in the search task (to stop or to continue the search) is similar to the
decision between the lotteries presented to you:
If you stop your search, you obtain a sure payoff, but if you decide to continue the search,
you essentially play a lottery with a risky outcome.
Which of the two lotteries, I or II, is most similar to the lottery that you play when you
continue the search from your point of view?
Lottery I: (e A, p%; e B, (100-p)%)
Lottery II: (e X, p%; e –Y, (100-p)%)
(A, B, X, and Y denote arbitrary positive numbers, and p is a (percentage) number be-
tween 0 and 100).
This question is of importance: Search models that are based on expected utility theory
(henceforth: EU-theory) assume that subjects evaluate the next search step as a pure
lottery (cf. lottery I). In contrast, the new rp-model assumes that subjects evaluate
the next search step as a mixed lottery (cf. lottery II). Therefore, the answer to the
search model question allows for subdividing the subject sample into two groups: subjects
behaving in a manner consistent with an EU-based model and subjects behaving in a
manner consistent with a model in which subjects set utility reference points.
A few final remarks on the design of experiment I: First, the purpose of including both
mixed (A-1) and pure (A-2) lottery tasks in the first part is to have subjects get used to
both tasks before they have to answer the search-model question. Second, to make sure
that subjects have sufficient experience with the search task and have been exposed to pure
as well as mixed lotteries, the search-model question is presented directly after they have
performed the search task. Third, since subjects are informed on the instruction sheet
about the properties of the search experiment (i.e., they are aware that their minimum
14 The graphical presentation of the two lotteries I and II presented in the search-model question is
identical with the graphical presentation of all other lotteries (see appendix, available in the JEDC
Supplement Archive). Furthermore, the two lotteries, I and II, are presented in random order.
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payoff is 0 and that their maximum payoff is 24), the certainty-equivalent method with
the values xmin = 0 and xmax = 24 is used after they have answered the search-model
question (i.e. in part C). This avoids the potential influence of an exposure to lotteries
with xmin = 0 and xmax = 24 on the answer to the search-model question.
3.2 Experiment II
Experiment II focused only on the relationship between risk attitude and search behavior.
In particular, any confounding effects, e.g. due to the exposure to lotteries that involve
losses, were avoided in experiment II. Correspondingly, experiment II involved only parts
B (elicitation of risk attitude) and C (elicitation of search behavior) and the order of
both tasks was randomized. While part B (the search task) was implemented identically
to experiment I, part C measured risk aversion based on the price list procedure used
by Holt and Laury (2002), henceforth HL. The price list procedure involves ten choices
between the paired lotteries described in table 1 . The payoffs are the same in all 10
choice situations and the payoffs for option A are less variable than the potential payoffs
for option B. While in the first row, the probability of the high payoff for both options
is 10%, it increases to 100% in the last row. A very risk seeking person should switch
to option B early, and an extremely risk averse person should switch over by decision
10 in the bottom row.15 Following the procedure in HL, payoffs for each subject were
determined by randomly implementing one of the ten lotteries and paying according to
the subjects decision on that lottery at the end of the experiment.
** Include table 1 about here **
3.3 Administration and Payoffs
Experiment I was conducted in the summer and fall of 2004 and experiment II was con-
ducted in February 2007. Both experiments were conducted in the experimental labo-
ratory of the SFB 504, a national research center at the University of Mannheim, and
involved undergraduate and graduate students from the University of Mannheim. The
experiments were run entirely on computers using software written by the author. All
payoff procedures, including the random selection of the search round and of the lottery
that would be paid out, took place after the experiment was over. The instruction sheet
presented full information about the search task and it was emphasized that, (i), subjects’
payoff was truncated at e0 (i.e., they could not incur losses from the search task) and
that, (ii), they would not earn a show-up fee (i.e., no reference point was induced).
4 Inference about Preferences and Search Behavior
This section first presents and discusses how risk and loss attitude are estimated from the
data obtained in the lottery tasks of the experiments. Then, I describe how individual
search behavior is classified based on the data obtained in the search experiments.
15 Note that the maximum payoff from this task is e24, as in the search task. That is, risk attitude is
measured in the same domain in which we observe the search behavior.
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4.1 Estimation of Risk Attitude
From the data obtained in experiment I I estimate individual risk attitude based on a
parametric approach allowing for a specification of both constant relative and constant
absolute risk aversion (CRRA and CARA, respectively). For both functional forms, the
utility function is estimated from the data obtained in part C using nonlinear least squares.
Utility functions of the power form (e.g., Abdellaoui, 2000; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992)
assume that subjects have constant relative risk aversion (CRRA):
u(x) = x(α+1) (18)
The estimated coefficient α characterizes each subject’s risk attitude under the CRRA-
assumption. If α > 0, the subject is risk seeking; if α < 0, the subject is risk averse.
Utility functions of the exponential form (e.g., Currim and Sarin, 1989; Pennings and
Smidts, 2000) assume that subjects have constant absolute risk aversion (CARA):
u(x) = 1− e−γ·x (19)
For γ = 0 the function is defined to be linear, i.e. the subject is risk neutral. In the CARA-
specification, the estimated coefficient γ characterizes each subject’s risk attitude in the
sense of an Arrow-Pratt-measure of risk attitude (Pratt, 1964), that is: −u′′(x)/u′(x) = γ.
If γ < 0, the subject is risk seeking; if γ > 0, the subject is risk averse.
For the data obtained in experiment II, I follow Holt and Laury (2002) and use the total
number of “safe” A choices as a measure of risk attitude.
4.2 Estimation of Loss Attitude
Based on the subjects’ responses in part A of the experiment, an individual-specific index
for loss aversion is calculated. The statistic λx = −y/x is a measure of individual loss
aversion, where x ∈ {-1,-10,-25,-50,-100} and y is the response to the corresponding lottery
given in part A. This method of estimating a coefficient of loss aversion is the method
used in Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and its idea is to obtain a simple measure that
captures the tradeoff between gains and losses. Note that because of the five x-values
that are used for the elicitation, I essentially elicit five different measures of loss aversion,
and I will use all five measures in the subsequent analyses. Additionally, I use OLS to
estimate one aggregate measure of loss aversion, λOLS, from all five x-values, assuming
the functional form specified in equation (17).16
4.3 Classification of Decision Rules Used in the Search Task
The next step of the analysis is to determine the decision rule used by each subject in
the search task. In order to do so, a fixed set of candidate decision rules is specified,
the “universe of search rules”, and the decision rule that fits observed behavior best is
attributed to each subject. Since the utility-based search models developed in section 2
16 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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establish a relationship between preference parameters and decision rules, I can assign
preference parameters to the subjects based on the attributed search rules.17
The Universe of Search Rules
For the investigation of the relationship between individual preferences and search be-
havior, I use as candidate decision rules all those search rules that can be derived from
the search models developed in section 2. The universe of search rules (i.e., the set of
candidate search rules that are used in this paper to characterize search behavior) consists
of the following 51 rules:
The first class of these decision rules, henceforth referred to as type-1-rules, share the
constant reservation price property (see figure 1). These rules are either based on the
assumption that subjects use the forward optimal search rule (equation (4), the EU-
based model that neglects sunk costs), or the stationary rp-model (equation (10), the
rp-model that neglects sunk costs). Each rule says that the subject uses a reservation
price r ∈ {78, ...,94} which is constant during the complete search round. The universe
contains 17 type-1-rules denoted by t178, t179, ..., t194. Every rule corresponds to a certain
risk attitude parameter αsearch and γsearch.18
The second class of decision rules is based on the finite horizon search model (i.e., the
backward optimal search rules developed in section 2). According to these type-2-rules,
the reservation price is a function of the search step t and of individual risk attitude.
I assume again 17 different type-2-rules, denoted by t2CRRA78 , t2
CRRA
79 , ..., t2
CRRA
94 , derived
based on the assumption of a CRRA-specification of the utility function: For the first
rule, the reservation price at t = 1 is 78, for the second rule, it is 79, etc., and for the last
rule it is 94 (see figure 2). Each reservation price path corresponds to a certain α-interval.
The 17 price paths t2CRRA78 , t2
CRRA
79 , ..., t2
CRRA
94 correspond to a decreasing sequence of 17
α-intervals taken from the interval [−0.973, 25.20].
Alternatively, the 17 type-2-rules can be derived based on the assumption of a CARA-
specification of the utility function (see figure 3). Then, each reservation price path
corresponds to a certain γ-interval, and the 17 paths correspond to an increasing sequence
of γ-intervals taken from [−2.028, 0.837]. In the paper, it will always be clear from the
context whether the particular type-2-rules are derived based on either a CRRA- or a
CARA-specification of the utility function. Conditional on the assumption that a certain
subject uses a finite horizon search model, risk coefficients αsearch and γsearch can be
attributed to her. These coefficients are the risk attitudes that explain best the observed
search behavior.
Finally, the type-3-rules are based on the non-stationary rp-model (16), the rp-model
developed under the assumption that subjects focus on total payoffs from searching. The
reservation price is a function of the search step t and of individual loss aversion λ (see
17 I can attribute only small intervals of preference parameters and not exact point-values, since the
prices presented in the price search task are discrete.
18 Under risk neutrality, one finds a constant reservation price of 86. The set of 17 constant reservation
price rules, t178, t179, ..., t194, is sufficiently large to classify all observed behavior, no subject is assigned
a lower or higher reservation price, if I allow for a larger universe of rules (for further information,
please see the appendix in the JEDC Supplement Archive).
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figure 4). Again, 17 different rules are considered, t378, t379, ..., t394: For the first rule, the
reservation price at t = 1 is 78, for the second rule, it is 79, etc., and for the last rule it is
94. The rules correspond to a decreasing sequence of λ-intervals taken from the interval
[0.042, 3.392]. Based on the type-3-rules, I attribute to every individual a loss coefficient
λsearch. The assigned loss attitude coefficient best explains the observed search behavior
conditional on the assumption that the subject uses the non-stationary rp-model.
Classification Procedure
To classify search behavior, I determine for each subject the proportion of choices consis-
tent with each decision rule and I maximize this proportion over the set of all candidate
decision rules (i.e., a subject is assigned the decision rule that generates the largest frac-
tion of correct predictions). It is assumed that each subject follows exactly one of the
decision rules in the universe of candidate rules and that she uses the same rule in each of
the 15 payoff tasks. This assumption seems reasonable in view of the fact that all subjects
are experienced with the search task when they begin the 15 payoff relevant tasks (see
section 3.1).
Formally, the classification procedure is described as follows: Each search rule ci ∈ C,
where C is the universe of search rules described above, is a unique map from subject
i’s information set Sit to her continuation decision dit ∈ {0, 1} : dciit (Sit) → {0, 1}. Now,
let d∗it denote the observed decision of subject i in period t. Then, define the indicator
function:
Xciit (Sit) = 1(d
∗
it = d
ci
it (Sit)) (20)
Let Ti be the number of decisions that are observed for subject i. I attribute to each
subject the search rule that maximizes the likelihood of being used by that subject:
cˆi = argmax
ci∈C
Ti∑
t=1
Xciit (Sit) (21)
5 Results
This section starts with self-contained descriptions of the findings from the utility function
elicitation (part A and part C) and from the search task (part B). The main contribution
of this section is the combination of the data on individual preferences and on search
behavior, such that correlations on the subject level can be analyzed. Specifically, I
test whether the hypotheses on the relationship between search behavior and preference
parameters, derived in section 2, are supported by the data. This section starts with a
detailed analysis of experiment I and ends with an analysis of experiment II which provides
further evidence on the relationship between individual preferences and sequential decision
behavior.
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5.1 Part C and Part A: Risk and Loss Attitude
From the data in part C two indices of risk attitude, an index α (CRRA specification)
and an index γ (CARA specification), were estimated for each subject.19
From the data obtained in part (A-1), five indices of loss attitude, λ1, λ10, λ25, λ50, and
λ100, as well as an aggregate index, λOLS, were calculated for each subject.
Table 2 reports results of the nonlinear least squares estimation of the risk coefficients
α and γ of the 106 participants, including the mean coefficient of determination R2 for
those two estimations. The coefficients of determination are close to 1 for all nonlinear
regressions. The proportions of different risk attitudes in the sample are independent of
the functional form assumption of the utility function. The proportions of subjects in the
particular categories is in line with findings in other experimental studies. For example,
the proportion of risk seeking subjects is higher than the proportions reported by studies
based on, e.g., price list elicitation methods (e.g., Harrison et al., 2005; Holt and Laury,
2002), and it is lower than the proportions reported by, e.g., Abdellaoui (2000).
** Include table 2 about here **
Table 3 shows the results of the loss aversion elicitation part of the experiment. Across
all loss aversion questions subjects were predominantly loss averse in their choices.20 I
find median loss aversion coefficients that are all significantly higher than 1. The values
are higher than those reported in Schmidt and Traub (2002), but lower than the median
values reported in Tversky and Kahneman (1992). As expected, there is a high and
statistically significant degree of correlation between the individual answers to the five
loss aversion questions (see table 4). In fact, 39% of the subjects exhibited constant loss
aversion, that is, their loss aversion coefficient is identical for all loss aversion questions.
** Include table 3 about here **
** Include table 4 about here **
5.2 Part B: Search Behavior
Search behavior differs considerably across individuals, detailed information by treatment
is presented in the appendix (section 8.3, available in the JEDC Supplement Archive).
Focusing on the average search duration of the subjects, I find overall a preponderance of
early stoppers compared to behavior under the risk neutral optimal stopping rule. This
confirms results from earlier experimental studies that have looked at search duration
(e.g., Cox and Oaxaca, 1996; Hey, 1987; Sonnemans, 1998, see the appendix in the JEDC
Supplement Archive for details).
19 Alternatively, the data from part (A-2) can be used for the estimation of risk attitude. The data from
part C are preferable, since in part C, the risk attitude index has been elicited in a monetary domain
which is identical to the payoff domain of the search task. (Part (A-2) has in fact only been included
to avoid order effects, see section 3.1). Therefore, only the results from part C are reported here.
The conclusions of this paper are identical if the data from part (A-2) are used. The corresponding
analyses can be obtained from the author upon request.
20 Several empirical studies confirm the predominance of loss averse choices (e.g., Fishburn and Kochen-
berger, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Schmidt and Traub, 2002; Pennings and Smidts, 2003).
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Considering (a) the universe of 51 search rules (see figures 1, 2, 3, and 4), (b) the rather low
average number of search steps compared to the optimal strategy, and (c) the fact that only
a finite number of search rounds per individual (namely 15 rounds) is observed, it is clear
that discrimination between very similar reservation price paths, that is across search rule
types (e.g., between t180, t280, and t380), is hardly possible. Individual search rule types
are not (empirically) identified.21 In contrast, the identification within a certain rule type
is clear: For example, there is significant difference in whether a subject’s behavior is more
consistent with, for example, t180 rather than with t181.
22 In other words, individual risk
attitude or loss attitude parameters can be attributed to a subject based on her behavior
in the search task, conditional on the assumption that the subject behaves according to a
specific model. But, as I have already discussed at the end of section 2.2, this model itself
cannot be identified based on the observation of the search behavior alone; independent
measures of preferences that are elicited in part A and part C are needed additionally.
5.3 The Search-Model Question: Subdividing the Sample
As I have explained above (see section 3.1), the search-model question is used to subdivide
the sample into PR and PC : 39 subjects answered that they see a similarity between the
search task and lotteries with gains and losses and were categorized into group PR; 67
subjects think about lotteries with only gains and were categorized into group PC .
Descriptive statistics on individual preferences and search behavior by subgroup are re-
ported in table 5.
** Include table 5 about here **
5.4 Analyzing Search Behavior and Individual Preferences
As mentioned above, observed search behavior alone is not sufficient to identify “users”
of the reference point model. However, in order to discriminate between subjects that
use the rp-model and subjects that use one of the classical EU-based models, I can derive
hypotheses on the relationship between search behavior and individual preferences that
are testable based on the information gained in parts A, B, and C of the experiment.
Essentially, I hypothesize that for subjects from PR, individual loss aversion is systemati-
cally related to search behavior, while for subjects from PC , risk aversion is systematically
related to search behavior:
Conditional on the assumption that a population PR of subjects uses the rp-model, the
rp-model predicts that:
(H1) The more loss averse – measured as λx in part A – a subject from P
R is, the fewer
search steps (denoted by ss) this subject should do in the search task.
(H2) For subjects from PR, the index of loss aversion λx – elicited in part A – should
be positively correlated with the index of loss aversion, λsearch, elicited in the search task,
21 Asymptotically, that is if an infinite number of search rounds per individual is observed, individual
search rules types are, of course, identified.
22 For more details about the classification, please see the appendix, section 8.3, available in the JEDC
Supplement Archive.
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part B.
Conditional on the assumption that a population PC of subjects does not use the rp-model
but one of the classical models (either the forward optimal search model or the backward
optimal search model), it is claimed that:
(H3) The more risk averse – measured as α and γ in the preference elicitation part C –
a subject from PC is, the fewer steps ss this subject should do in the search task.
(H4) For subjects from PC , the indices of risk attitude – measured as α and γ in the
preference elicitation part C – should be positively correlated with the particular indices
of risk attitude γsearch and αsearch, respectively, revealed through the search behavior.
In the remainder of this section, I study the correlation between preference parameters
and search parameters in the sample. Then, I develop a structural econometric model that
investigates which of the risk and loss aversion measures has better explanatory power for
the observed search duration. Before these analyses, it is helpful to compare descriptive
statistics on preference estimates (see table 2 and table 3) with the theoretical findings
on the relationship between preference parameters and search behavior (see section 4.3).
This gives a first impression of the relationship between the empirical findings and the
theory.
Risk attitude (CRRA-specification): Table 2 shows that all estimates for α lie in the in-
terval [−0.457, 2.345]. From the developed search models follows that these estimates
correspond to reservation price paths that start between 83 (for α = 2.345) and 87 (for
α = −0.457). That is, essentially only the following search rules are compatible with the
preference estimates: {tX83, ..., tX87} for X ∈ {1, 2}.
Risk attitude (CARA-specification): Table 2 shows that all estimates for γ lie in the in-
terval [−0.153, 0.093]. These estimates correspond to reservation price paths that start
between 84 (for γ = −0.153) and 87 (for γ = 0.093). That is, only the following search
rules are relevant: {tX84, ..., tX87} for X ∈ {1, 2}.
Loss attitude: The estimated λx-values lie in the interval [0.5, 20], see table 3 . This
corresponds to reservation price paths that start between 83 (for λ = 0.5) and 98 (for
λ = 20).23 From the universe of search rules, the following rules apply: {tX83, ..., tX94}
for X = 3.
The first finding from this descriptive analysis is: The variation in the estimated lev-
els of individual risk attitude is not sufficient to explain the heterogeneity in the observed
search behavior. As I have already argued, the complete universe of search rules is needed
and also sufficient to describe the search behavior of all observed subjects (please see the
appendix in the JEDC Supplement Archive for further information). The second finding
from the descriptive analysis is that the estimated loss aversion coefficients are compatible
with a considerably wider range of different search rules than the estimated risk aversion
coefficients. Except for one subject, the variation in loss aversion exactly captures the
range of observed heterogeneity in search behavior.
23 It was always the same subject who is responsible for the maximum value for λ in all five cases (see
table 3. Without this subject, reservation price paths between 83 and 95 would correspond to all
estimated λx-values.
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Correlation Analysis
Table 6 reports the results of an investigation of the above mentioned hypotheses (H1)-
(H4) based on a rank correlation analysis between observed preference and search parame-
ters. A clear pattern emerges: For the complete sample P , there are negative correlations
of at least marginal significance between the different estimates of individual loss aversion
and the number of search steps (ss); this is consistent with (H1). In contrast, measures
of individual risk attitude (α and γ) are not correlated with the number of search steps.
For the subgroup PR, I find strong support for (H1): There are significantly negative
correlations between all different estimates for individual loss aversion and the number
of search steps (ss), demonstrating the robustness of the results. For four out of the six
estimated values, the correlation is even significant at the 1%-level. Additionally, results
from these analyses support (H2): The estimates for individual loss aversion derived from
the lottery questions, λx, and the estimates derived from the observed search behavior,
λsearch, are correlated at the 10%-level (λ1 and λ10), or at the 5%-level (λ25, λ50, λ100, and
λOLS). For P
C , no significant correlations are found at all. Furthermore, we find that the
hypotheses (H3) and (H4) are not supported by any of the considered subgroups either.
** Include table 6 about here **
Unobserved Effects Duration Analysis
A structural econometric analysis of the relationship between individual preferences and
search duration is presented in this subsection and controls for the simultaneous influence
of risk and loss attitude on search behavior. Additionally, this analysis includes unob-
served effects for each search round in order to capture possible behavioral differences
that stem from the particular sequence of price draws that the subjects face in each single
round. The analysis also exploits the discrete time-to-event-nature and multiple-spell-
nature: The event is the stopping of the search, the duration is measured discretely as
the number of search steps, and 15 spells (= search rounds) per subject were observed.
For one specific search round, let T ≥ 1 denote the search duration that has some distribu-
tion in the population. From the distribution function of T , I derive the hazard function
h0(t) for T . The discrete time hazard gives the probability of stopping the search in the
next time step, conditional on not having stopped so far:
h0(t) = P (T = t | T ≥ t) (22)
Assuming that the subjects in the population use a constant reservation price rule, the
hazard function h0(t) is constant. That is, the stopping events are generated from a
process without memory and h0(t) = h0, leading to a geometric duration distribution.
24
To account for the finite horizon nature of the search problem (i.e., subjects stop their
search in time step 25 if they have not been successful until then), a piecewise constant
hazard function is used:
h0(t) =
{
h1 t < 25
h2 t = 25.
(23)
24 The constant hazard assumption can be motivated based on theoretical deliberations and based on
empirical findings about the fit of constant reservation price paths. The constant hazard assumption
is discussed in the appendix, section 8.4, available in the JEDC Supplement Archive.
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To investigate the hypotheses derived above, I test whether the hazard, i.e. the conditional
probability of stopping in the next time step, can be explained by individual preference
parameters. Therefore, two covariates X are used in the hazard function: one covariate
that characterizes risk attitude (α or γ) and one covariate characterizing loss attitude
(λ1, λ10, λ25, λ50, λ100, or λOLS). The idea of a proportional hazard is adopted (i.e., the
conditional individual probability of stopping the search differs proportionately based on
a function of the covariates). For discrete time data, this leads to the complementary
log-logistic model (Clayton and Hills, 1993) and the discrete time hazard can be written
as:
hi(t,X) = 1− exp[−exp(β′Xi + δ1h1 + δ2h2)], (24)
where, i = 1,..., 106. β is a parameter vector, h1 and h2 characterize the baseline hazard.
Now, recall that every subject had to play 15 search rounds. All prices were drawn from
a uniform distribution. The series of price draws are different across rounds but they
are identical across individuals. Therefore, I expect an unobserved effect for each search
round. To account for this unobserved heterogeneity, a random effect that is common to
all observations from a certain search round j (j = 1, ..., 15) is included. The following
model is considered:
hi,j(t,X) = 1− exp[−exp(β′Xi + δ1h1 + δ2h2 + uj)] (25)
where uj is supposed to be normally distributed with mean zero.
Table 7 presents estimation results for the complete sample and for the subgroups. In all
estimations a likelihood ratio test suggests that the included unobserved effect is highly
statistically significant. For the complete sample of subjects, P , (H1) is supported: An
increase in individual loss aversion is related to a significant increase in the conditional
probability of stopping the search, i.e. to a decrease in search duration. This effect
is significant at the 5%-level for λ10, λ25, and λ50; it is marginally significant for λ1,
regardless of the specification of the risk attitude coefficient (α or γ). In all specifications,
risk attitude has no significant explanatory power for search duration.
Considering the subsample PR, stronger support for (H1) is found: Apart from λ100,
the estimates for individual loss aversion have explanatory power for search duration at
the 5%-significance level (λOLS), or even at the 1%-level (λ1, λ10, λ25, and λ50). Again,
individual risk attitude is insignificant in all specifications.
In the subgroup PC , no preference parameter has significant explanatory power. I have
performed all analyses presented in table 7 including higher order terms of the risk and loss
aversion measures in order to test for possible nonlinear relationships. Similarly, I have
included information on participant age, gender, and field of study. The same conclusions
as those reported above are obtained. While the risk attitude terms are never jointly
significant, the loss attitude terms are jointly significant in the same cases as reported in
table 7 . Furthermore, sociodemographic characteristics are always insignificant.25
25 The robustness of the results from the duration analysis has been checked in detail. Please see the
appendix (available in the JEDC Supplement Archive), section 8.4, for a brief discussion of different
specifications of the duration model.
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** Include table 7 about here **
According to the analyses presented above, all estimated loss attitude coefficients have
better explanatory power for individual search behavior than the estimated risk attitude
coefficients, which are insignificant in all analyses. The findings concerning the explana-
tory power of loss aversion do not hold for the subgroup PC , but they are very strong
for the subgroup PR, suggesting that members of the two groups behave differently when
“solving” the search task.
Further Evidence from Experiment II
In experiment II, risk attitude of the subjects was measured according to Holt and Laury
(2002) as the point where a subject switches from option A to option B.26 Very risk seeking
subjects have a low switchpoint, risk averse subjects have a high switchpoint. The mean
switchpoint is 6.6, suggesting that subjects are risk averse on average. Similar to Holt
and Laury I also find that more than two thirds of the subjects choose more than 4 safe
choices. Table 8 displays the distribution of risk attitudes for the 40 participants.
** Include table 8 about here **
The most direct way of testing for a relationship between risk attitude and search behavior
is to correlate the HL measure of risk attitude and the number of search steps on a subject
level. A correlation coefficient ρ of −0.05 and a p-value of 0.76 are found, suggesting that
preference parameters and search behavior are not correlated.
6 Discussion
This paper focuses on the development and experimental testing of various models for
dynamic choice behavior, in particular the reference point model (rp-model). The results
suggest that the rp-model is similar to EU-based models in its predictions about reserva-
tion price paths, but it is better than EU-based models in reconciling the experimental
data on individual preferences with the data on individual search behavior. Combined
with established empirical results on individual preferences (such as the empirical dis-
tribution of loss aversion in a population, see, e.g., Johnson et al., 2006; Pennings and
Smidts, 2003; Schmidt and Traub, 2002; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), the rp-model –
in contrast to EU-based models – is consistent with many existing findings on search be-
havior, for example the considerable heterogeneity of search rules and the predominance
of early stopping in the population (Cox and Oaxaca, 1989; Hey, 1987; Sonnemans, 1998).
To further investigate individual heterogeneity, I hypothesize that at least a specific sub-
group, PR, of the subjects uses the proposed rp-model, and I find strong evidence for this
hypothesis. The subgroup PR is identified with the help of the search-model question.
Under the assumption that subjects understand this question correctly, the question is
likely to be an instrument for dividing the complete sample into the particular subgroups
26 All except one of the 40 subjects (97.5%) switched only once. As in Holt and Laury (2002), the findings
from the analysis reported in this paper do not change if the subject who switches from B back to A
is dropped.
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PR and PC . Note, however, that the main result of this paper – namely that individual
loss aversion is systematically related to search behavior, whereas risk aversion is not
related to search behavior – holds independently of this search-model question.
Two issues have to be kept in mind when interpreting the results from this study. First,
the presented experimental setup is based on one specific search environment which is
characterized by the price distribution, the search cost, and the option to recall previously
rejected offers. It is conceivable that subjects behave differently in a different search
environment, e.g., an environment, in which the price distribution is not known. A second
modification would be to allow for considerably longer time between the search steps. In
this case, the observed effect of loss aversion might rather be called an endowment effect
(Huck et al., 2005; Kahneman et al., 1991): If a person holds an object that she may keep
for sure for a certain time, she might consider this object as an endowment, and the next
step in the search is evaluated only relative to this endowment.
The contribution of this paper is to link information on behavior in an elementary dynamic
choice situation with information on individual preferences and to investigate correlations
at the subject level. Controlling for the effect of risk attitude, I obtain support for the
hypothesis that loss aversion is related to the observed heterogeneity in sequential decision
behavior. However, there is no evidence that risk aversion is related to sequential decision
behavior, i.e. there is no evidence that support the classical EU-based models. Note at
this point that different measures for risk aversion have been used and the evidence is
consistent: In experiment I, I used a measure based on the certainty equivalent method
(Wakker and Deneffe, 1996) and in experiment II, a measure that is based on a price list
method (Holt and Laury, 2002) was used. Finally, in a related contribution that focuses on
people’s search heuristics and on a different dynamic choice context, Schunk and Winter
(2009) use a parameter-free trade-off method (Abdellaoui, 2000).
There are two principal explanations for the findings of this paper: First, although the
presented findings are based on three different risk elicitation methods, loss aversion could
simply be better to measure than risk aversion. This explanation would concern all studies
that use stakes at the laboratory level and that involve measures of individual preferences.
A second explanation which is in line with existing laboratory and field evidence on myopic
loss aversion in dynamic decision tasks, such as stock market decisions (e.g., Baucells, et
al., 2007; Benartzi and Thaler, 1995; Odean, 1998), is that people set reference points
during their search.
Future work investigating the link between preferences and behavior could extend this
study by focusing on the question to what extent certain independently elicited preference
measures (e.g. risk preferences elicited in lottery tasks) are able to exactly predict the
usage of the corresponding stopping rule in the search task. Similarly, how people exactly
form and update reference points in dynamic choice situations is still an important open
question. This paper contributes to this literature through the laboratory analysis of a
stylized and easily understandable, but sufficiently complex and representative dynamic
choice task, which ensures full control for the researcher. While it is of very basic interest
to get a better understanding of the foundations of dynamic choice behavior, the paper
is also of direct relevance. For example, the findings of this paper can be combined with
findings on the distribution of loss aversion in the population (see, e.g., Johnson et al.,
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2006, who provide a large sample multivariate analysis of the distribution of loss aversion
in the German, Austrian, and Swiss population). It follows, that older people as well as
less educated people deviate more from optimality in their search behavior than others.
That is, these people would stop too early when searching for the best price of a product
or when searching for jobs on the labor market.
7 Conclusions
People are heterogeneous with respect to their dynamic choice behavior. Using data ob-
tained in two controlled laboratory experiments that involved a search task as a simple
representative of dynamic choice situations, I have shown that this heterogeneity can be
linked to heterogeneity in individual preferences, specifically to loss aversion. In contrast,
various measures for risk aversion have no explanatory power. The newly proposed ref-
erence point model describes observed search behavior better than models derived from
expected utility theory. Overall, these findings suggest that in search tasks, many people
set utility reference points tasks which they use to evaluate potential future outcomes.
Interestingly, there is also a considerable fraction of people whose behavior seems inconsis-
tent with utility-based decision models. Knowing the preferences (risk or loss attitude) of
these people does not help us predict their behavior. In most cases, a few simple decision
heuristics govern these people’s behavior. Houser and Winter (2004) and Sonnemanns
(1998, 2000) classify those simple behavioral rules in a similar dynamic choice environ-
ment. Schunk and Winter (2009) show that the behavior of those individuals for whom
there is no relationship with individual risk preferences, indeed often often corresponds
to simple decision heuristics, such as satisficer heuristics or constant reservation price
heuristics.
The finding that there is considerable heterogeneity in decision behavior is not new, and
numerous studies have investigated the link between individual preferences and behavioral
heterogeneity in static decision situations. The specific contribution of this paper is to
provide information about the link between heterogeneity in individual preferences and
heterogeneity in dynamic choice behavior via experimental tests of various models of
dynamic choice behavior. The findings of this paper, particularly the result that many
people set reference points in dynamic choice tasks, are of interest for researchers who
incorporate behavioral heterogeneity into models of dynamic choice behavior. They are
relevant for recent theoretical and applied research in, e.g., decision theory and marketing
science (Zwick et al., 2003), labor economics (Eckstein and van den Berg, 2007), finance
(Gneezy, 2005; Baucells, 2007), and life-cycle theory (Bowman et al., 1999).
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8 Appendix
8.1 Graphical Presentation of the Lotteries on the Computer Screen
** Include figure 5 about here **
Note: The instructions for the two experiments and the software for running the experi-
ment can be obtained from the author upon request.
8.2 On the Function p(x,mt, t) in the RP-Model
The form of the rp-payoff-function p(x,mt, t) becomes clear under a rigorous case differ-
entiation with respect to possible price draws. q(·) and v(·) are defined as in section 2.2,
i.e.
q(y) =
{
q(y) = y y ≥ 0
0 y < 0
(26)
v(y) =
{
v(y) = y y ≥ −c
0 y < −c (27)
The following cases are possible:
Case 1
The price draw is better than the best price in hand minus the search cost: x < mt − c
• mt ≥ 100− c · t
⇒ p(x,mt, t) = 100− c · t− x− c = q(100− c · t− x− c)
• mt < 100− c · t
⇒ p(x,mt, t) = mt − x− c = v(mt − x− c)
Case 2
The price draw is worse than the best price in hand minus the search cost: x ≥ mt − c
• mt ≥ 100− c · t
⇒ p(x,mt, t) = 0 = q(100− c · t− x− c)
• mt < 100− c · t
• mt − c ≤ x ≤ mt
⇒ p(x,mt, t) = mt − x− c = v(mt − x− c)
• mt < x
• mt ≤ 100− c · t− c
⇒ p(x,mt, t) = −c = v(mt − (100− c · t))
• mt > 100− c · t− c
⇒ p(x,mt, t) = mt − (100− c · t) = v(mt − (100− c · t))
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8.3 Details on Search Behavior
Descriptive Findings
In total, 8532 stop-or-go-decisions [3025 decisions in experiment II] were observed. The
mean number of search steps for all 15 search rounds was 80.5 [75.6 in experiment II],
with a minimum of 49 [37] steps, a maximum of 135 [107] steps and a standard deviation
of 18.1 [17.5] steps. The mean number of search steps per search round was 5.4 [5.0], with
a minimum of 1 [1], a maximum of 25 [25] and a standard deviation of 3.4 [3.3] steps.
The mean number of search steps was significantly lower than the number of search
steps which would be expected under the assumption of risk neutrality: The expected
number of search rounds for an individual that uses the forward optimal search rule (i.e.,
a constant reservation price of 86) is 6.3 steps. Under a finite horizon model, 7.2 steps are
expected. Figure 6 shows the distribution of mean search durations for the subjects from
both experiments (experiment I and experiment II). Most of the mass of the distribution
is to the left of a mean search duration of 7.2, i.e. there is a preponderance of early
stoppers compared to the risk neutral optimal stopping rule. This is in line with results
in earlier studies (e.g. Cox and Oaxaca, 1996; Hey, 1987; Sonnemans, 1998). Figure 7
shows the distribution of constant reservation price rules in the sample, conditional on
the assumption that all subjects use such a rule.
** Include figure 6 about here **
** Include figure 7 about here **
Classification of Search Behavior
This section presents some results of the classification procedure:
If the universe of search rules is limited to the 17 type-1-rules – the constant reservation
price rules – 92.8% [92.1% in experiment II] of all observed stop-or-go-decisions can be
explained. When limited to the type-2-rules, 93.0% [92.3%] are explained under the
CARA-specification and 92.7% [91.8%] under the CRRA-specification. Finally, the type-
3-rules explain 92.8% [92.0%] of all decisions.
In this context, it is important to note that the main purpose of the classification method
is not to determine a minimal universe of decision rules that best describes the behavior
of all subjects in the sample but to estimate the preference parameters that best describe
observed search behavior. Therefore, the possible over-fitting is not a problem for the
analysis presented in this paper. In that, the presented method is akin to estimating
other preference parameters from experimental data.
The findings presented here in the appendix have again made clear that it is impossible
to attribute search models to the subjects merely based on their revealed search behavior
unless we have much more observations per subject; i.e., discrimination across search rule
types is infeasible. Since I can clearly discriminate within a certain rule-type – i.e., I can
discriminate between, e.g., rule t1p and rule t1q (for p, q ∈ {78, ..., 94} and p 6= q) – I am
able to attribute preference parameters (risk or loss attitude, depending on the search
model) to the subjects.
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8.4 On the Duration Analysis
The Assumption of a Constant Hazard
The main motivation for the constant hazard assumption is the finding in section 5.2 and
further detailed in the appendix (section 8.3) that a discrimination between the different
search rule-types is hardly possible, since all search rules have a similar rate of consistency
with the observed search behavior. It follows that the assumption of a constant reservation
price, that is a type-1-rule, is generally a good proxy for the observed search behavior. A
constant reservation price, in turn, implies a constant hazard in the duration model, as
the reservation price path is interpreted as a hazard function in a duration model.
A glance at figures 1, 2, 3, and 4 reveals that all of the rules in the universe of search
rules consist of an initial part that has a constant reservation price. What rule is least
consistent with the assumption of a constant reservation price that is used for the duration
analysis? Figure 3 reveals that if a subject uses a CARA-finite horizon rule and if the
subject is very risk averse, it might be using the worst rule in terms of consistency with
the constant hazard assumption. The subject might then have a reservation price of 94 at
t = 1 and t = 2, and the price starts falling already from t = 3 on. The probability that
this individual does not search for more than two steps is 1 − (1− 20
76
)2 ≈ 46%. That is,
even in this “worst case”, the constant hazard assumption is correct in 46% of all cases,
and this “worst case” characterizes only very few subjects, as figure 6 reveals.
Since a certain reservation price path in figure 1, 2, 3, or 4 can be interpreted as the
hazard function of the particular individual that is using the corresponding search rule,
a modeling approach that is nonparametric concerning the individual hazard function
would effectively require the identification of reservation price paths. With the data at
hand, this is practically impossible without further restrictions on the hazard function,
given the identification problems encountered in section 4.3, which stem from the low
number of observations per subject.
Robustness
Various alternative specifications for the duration model have been considered:
(a) It is tempting to include a random effect for each subject instead of including an
effect for each search round. In this specification the unobserved effect term is highly
insignificant. However, all results presented in this paper also hold in this specification,
although in some cases they are statistically weaker.
(b) If the unobserved effect is left out from the estimated model, results are obtained
that are virtually identical with results that are obtained based on the random effect
specification for each subject (see specification (a) above).
(c) The hazard h1 is highly significant in all estimations, but the drop-out term h2 for
time-step 25 is in general not significant, suggesting a specification without h2 (i.e., a
constant hazard instead of a piecewise constant hazard). All results are very similar to
those reported in the paper; the effect of the loss aversion coefficient on search duration
is even stronger than in the results reported in the paper.
In sum, the findings from alternative specifications support the conclusions that are drawn
in this paper.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Experiment II: The ten paired lottery-choice decisions.
Option A Option B
10% of e12.50, 90% of e10.00 10% of e24.00, 90% of e0.60
20% of e12.50, 80% of e10.00 20% of e24.00, 80% of e0.60
30% of e12.50, 70% of e10.00 30% of e24.00, 70% of e0.60
40% of e12.50, 60% of e10.00 40% of e24.00, 60% of e0.60
50% of e12.50, 50% of e10.00 50% of e24.00, 50% of e0.60
60% of e12.50, 40% of e10.00 60% of e24.00, 40% of e0.60
70% of e12.50, 30% of e10.00 70% of e24.00, 30% of e0.60
80% of e12.50, 20% of e10.00 80% of e24.00, 20% of e0.60
90% of e12.50, 10% of e10.00 90% of e24.00, 10% of e0.60
100% of e12.50, 0% of e10.00 100% of e24.00, 0% of e0.60
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Table 2: Experiment I: Estimation results of the CRRA and CARA utility function specification
and classification of subjects according to their risk attitude.
Functional specification
CRRA(α) CARA (γ)
Minimum coefficient estimate -0.457 -0.153
Maximum coefficient estimate 2.345 0.093
Median coefficient estimate 0.000 0.000
Mean R2 of all estimates 0.998 0.998
Proportion risk averse 37% 37%
Proportion risk neutral 37% 37%
Proportion risk seeking 26% 26%
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Table 3: Experiment I: Estimation results of the loss aversion indices and classification of
subjects according to their loss attitude.
λ100 λ50 λ25 λ10 λ1 λOLS
Minimum λ 1 .9 .96 .9 .5 1
Maximum λ 10 16 20 20 20 11.6
Median λ 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.9 1.5 1.6
Loss averse 70% 69% 69% 69% 61% 75%
Loss neutral 30% 30% 30% 30% 37% 25%
Loss seeking 0% 1% 1% 1% 2% 0%
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Table 4: Experiment I: Pearson correlation between the different loss aversion coefficients. All
correlations are statistically significant at the 1%-level.
λ100 λ50 λ25 λ10 λ1 λOLS
λ100 1.00
λ50 0.88 1.00
λ25 0.82 0.95 1.00
λ10 0.80 0.94 0.96 1.00
λ1 0.66 0.73 0.72 0.74 1.00
λOLS 0.99 0.94 0.88 0.86 0.70 1.00
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Table 5: Experiment I: Descriptive statistics for the complete sample (n=106) and subgroups
PR (n=39) and PC (n=67).
Complete Sample PR PC
Median Std.Dev. Median Std.Dev. Median Std.Dev.
λ1 1.5 2.57 1.5 1.72 1.5 2.96
λ10 1.9 2.63 1.7 1.41 2.0 3.12
λ25 1.6 2.38 1.5 1.02 1.6 2.86
λ50 1.6 2.27 1.5 1.21 1.8 2.68
λ100 1.7 2.10 1.5 1.84 2.0 2.23
λOLS 1.6 2.10 1.5 1.62 1.87 2.31
α 0.0 0.38 0.0 0.26 0.0 0.44
γ 0.0 0.04 0.0 0.03 0.0 0.04
Search steps (ss) 80.49 18.05 81.79 18.99 79.73 17.57
11
Table 6: Experiment I: Spearman correlations between preferences and search parameters for
the (sub)samples.
[P (106 individuals)]
Search steps (ss) λsearch αsearch γsearch
ρ p-value ρ p-value ρ p-value ρ p-value
λ1 -0.10 0.29 0.04 0.65
λ10 -0.17 0.07 0.11 0.28
λ25 -0.17 0.07 0.08 0.39
λ50 -0.16 0.09 0.10 0.29
λ100 -0.16 0.09 0.11 0.28
λOLS -0.16 0.09 0.10 0.29
α -0.02 0.87 0.03 0.78
γ -0.01 0.88 0.06 0.63
[ PR (39 individuals)]
Search steps (ss) λsearch αsearch γsearch
ρ p-value ρ p-value ρ p-value ρ p-value
λ1 -0.32 0.05 0.28 0.09
λ10 -0.40 0.01 0.30 0.06
λ25 -0.40 0.01 0.30 0.05
λ50 -0.38 0.02 0.32 0.05
λ100 -0.41 0.01 0.33 0.04
λOLS -0.43 0.01 0.36 0.02
α -0.10 0.56 0.00 1.00
γ 0.10 0.56 0.00 0.99
[ PC (67 individuals)]
Search steps (ss) λsearch αsearch γsearch
ρ p-value ρ p-value ρ p-value ρ p-value
λ1 0.03 0.80 -0.09 0.48
λ10 -0.03 0.82 -0.01 0.95
λ25 -0.04 0.77 -0.04 0.75
λ50 -0.03 0.83 -0.01 0.91
λ100 -0.02 0.89 -0.02 0.90
λOLS -0.02 0.87 -0.02 0.87
α 0.07 0.55 0.03 0.81
γ -0.07 0.57 0.00 1.00
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Table 7: Experiment I: Structural estimation. Results for various preference specifications and
(sub)samples. I include 2 covariates and an unobserved effect in each panel regression: One covari-
ate for loss attitude (λ1, λ10, λ25, λ50, λ100, or λOLS) and one for risk attitude (α or γ), i.e., 12 regressions
for each sample.
[ P (106 individuals)]
CRRA CARA
Regressor Coefficient p-value Regressor Coefficient p-value
λ1 0.02 0.08 λ1 0.02 0.07
α 0.02 0.73 γ -0.59 0.34
λ10 0.02 0.04 λ10 0.02 0.03
α 0.04 0.57 γ -0.76 0.23
λ25 0.02 0.03 λ25 0.02 0.02
α 0.02 0.75 γ -0.69 0.28
λ50 0.02 0.04 λ50 0.03 0.02
α 0.02 0.77 γ -0.68 0.28
λ100 0.02 0.12 λ100 0.02 0.11
α 0.02 0.74 γ -0.58 0.35
λOLS 0.02 0.14 λOLS 0.02 0.12
α 0.02 0.76 γ -0.56 0.37
[ PR (39 individuals)]
CRRA CARA
Regressor Coefficient p-value Regressor Coefficient p-value
λ1 0.07 0.01 λ1 0.07 0.01
α 0.17 0.28 γ -1.67 0.15
λ10 0.09 0.00 λ10 0.09 0.00
α 0.18 0.26 γ -1.80 0.12
λ25 0.14 0.00 λ25 0.14 0.00
α 0.20 0.21 γ -1.91 0.11
λ50 0.09 0.01 λ50 0.09 0.01
α 0.15 0.35 γ -1.61 0.16
λ100 0.04 0.09 λ100 0.04 0.08
α 0.18 0.26 γ -1.72 0.14
λOLS 0.05 0.04 λOLS 0.05 0.04
α 0.18 0.27 γ -1.73 0.15
[ PC (67 individuals)]
CRRA CARA
Regressor Coefficient p-value Regressor Coefficient p-value
λ1 0.02 0.17 λ1 0.02 0.18
α -0.02 0.83 γ 0.11 0.89
λ10 0.02 0.17 λ10 0.02 0.18
α 0.00 1.00 γ -0.09 0.91
λ25 0.02 0.09 λ25 0.02 0.10
α -0.01 0.94 γ -0.04 0.96
λ50 0.02 0.08 λ50 0.02 0.08
α -0.01 0.94 γ -0.06 0.94
λ100 0.03 0.12 λ100 0.03 0.13
α -0.01 0.86 γ 0.10 0.90
λOLS 0.02 0.20 λOLS 0.02 0.21
α -0.02 0.82 γ 0.14 0.85
Note: Inclusion of higher order terms of the risk and loss aversion measures (in order to test for possible
nonlinear relationships) as well as inclusion of information on participant age, gender, and field of study
in the panel regressions does not change findings.
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Table 8: Experiment II: Risk aversion classifications based on the HL task.
Number of Frequency Percentage
safe choices
0-1 0 0.0%
2 0 0.0%
3 1 2.5%
4 3 7.5%
5 4 10.0%
6 12 30.0%
7 10 25.0%
8 5 12.5%
9-10 5 12.5%
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Figure 1: Constant reservation price path (type-1-rules) for different risk attitudes in, e.g.,
CARA or CRRA specifications of a utility function. The more risk averse a searcher is, the
higher is her reservation price level.
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Figure 2: Reservation price path for type-2-rules for different risk attitudes. CRRA specifi-
cation of the utility function. The more risk averse a searcher is, the higher is her reservation
price level.
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Figure 3: Reservation price path for type-2-rules and different risk attitudes. CARA specifi-
cation of the utility function. The more risk averse a searcher is, the higher is her reservation
price level.
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Figure 4: Reservation price path for type-3-rules: Non-stationary reference point model under
risk neutrality. The more loss averse a searcher is, the higher is her reservation price level.
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Figure 5: Graphical presentation of the lotteries on the computer screen.
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Figure 6: Distribution of mean search durations for both experiments. We observe that most
subjects stop earlier than predicted by the risk neutral optimal stopping rule.
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Figure 7: Imposing a constant reservation price rule on every subject, I obtain the following
distribution of constant reservation price rules in the sample. The lowest observed reservation
price is e78, the highest reservation price is e94.
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